

***PowerCyber*: CPS Security Testbed for Power Grid**

REMOTE ACCESS INTERFACE USER GUIDE

Version 1.0

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PowerCyber: TESTBED OVERVIEW

1.1 Introduction

The PowerCyber testbed at Iowa State University, consists of a hybrid mix of industry standard hardware and software, emulated components and real-time power system simulators for hardware-in-the-loop CPS security experimentation for the Smart Grid. The PowerCyber test-bed provides a virtual critical infrastructure environment wherein realistic experiments on wide area monitoring, wide area control and distributed decision making in the smart grid environment can be carried out.

1.2 Architecture




Fig. 1. PowerCyber CPS Security Testbed Architecture

Figure 1 shows the current architecture of the PowerCyber CPS Security testbed at ISU. The testbed consists of SCADA hardware/software from Siemens that include substation automation system (SICAM PAS), control center software (Power TG), SCADA and substation communication protocols (DNP3, IEC 61850, IEEE C37.118), and security technologies (Scalence: Firewall, VPN), four multifunction protection relays (7SJ610, 7SJ82), three SEL 421 Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) and a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC).

1.3 Supported Use cases

1.3.1 Vulnerability Assessment:

PowerCyber supports vulnerability assessment of industry grade SCADA software and hardware platforms, network protocols and configurations to detect unknown vulnerabilities based on standard vulnerability databases. Several unknown vulnerabilities were discovered and a responsible disclosure process was followed to disclose them to vendors and appropriate regulatory authorities.

1.3.2 Impact Analysis & Mitigation Research:

PowerCyber provides a realistic virtual critical infrastructure environment wherein realistic experiments on wide-area monitoring, protection, and control in the smart grid environment can be carried out. Specifically, the testbed has been used to evaluate coordinated attacks on Remedial Action Schemes, and data integrity attacks on automatic generation control. Also, the testbed allows the implementation of defense measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, software patches, etc., to also evaluate the performance of various mitigation strategies.

1.3.3 Testbed Federation:

Recently, the PowerCyber testbed was successfully federated with the DETER testbed and the ISERINK platform, as part of Smart America Challenge and NIST Global City Teams Challenge to create a large-scale, high-fidelity CPS security testbed environment. The federated testbed was used to demonstrate proof-of-concept attack-defense experimentation on a wide-area protection scheme. Additional use cases to showcase the utility of CPS testbed federation are currently being explored.

1.3.4 Attack-Defense Exercise & Operator Training:

The PowerCyber testbed and the ISERINK platform for cyber defense competitions had been recently integrated to conduct realistic cyber attack-defense training exercises for utility practitioners at the NERC GridSecCon 2015 conference. Also, PowerCyber has been used every year as part of an industry workshop to provide hands-on training sessions.

1.3.5 Model Development:

PowerCyber testbed is currently developing a repository of standardized models and experimental datasets for power systems and associated cyber systems to facilitate researchers in leveraging the testbed capabilities for cyber security experimentation.

1.3.6 Remote Access:

In order to engage and enable a broad user community to perform a variety of power grid related cyber security experimentation, a remote access framework is currently being developed on the PowerCyber testbed. Specifically, this document will provide details of the implementation architecture, design flow and user interface manual of the PowerCyber testbed remote access framework.

PowerCyber: FRAMEWORK & DESIGN FLOW

2.1 Overall Framework

Figure 2 shows the overall framework used for enabling remote CPS security experimentation on PowerCyber testbed. The framework comprises of three fundamental building blocks.




Fig. 2. Remote Access Framework

2.1.1 Front-end Web Server - The front-end web server interacts with the user through a web-based user interface. It provides options to select and customize experimental scenarios and also provides options to collect experimental results. The front-end web server is integrated tightly to a backend orchestration framework written in python.

2.1.2 Backend Orchestration Framework - The back-end framework orchestrates the creation/configuration of the necessary cyber resources such as the SCADA virtual machines, manages the interaction with the power system simulators and physical devices such as the relays and PMUs, coordinates various attack actions and defense measures depending on the user input, and also provides a way for the users to collect relevant simulation artifacts from the cyber system and the physical system in the form of log files, packet captures, plots, etc.

2.1.3 Models and Libraries - In order to provide standard experimental scenarios as part of the remote access web interface a library of commonly used power system models need to be developed. This includes models with appropriate WAMPAC applications modeled, commonly used attack vectors, defense measures, etc.,

2.2 Design Flow

The following list represent key steps in the overall designflow for performing automated, cyber attack/defense experimentation:

- **Real-Time Grid Simulation:** The first stage involves the selection of the power system model to be used for the experiment. For example, the standard IEEE system models such as 39 bus, 118 bus, etc.,
- **WAMPAC experiment selection:** Once the powersystem model has been selected, the next stage is to identify the Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) experiment that is to be used for the experiment. This stage would also involve an identification of how the physical components are mapped to the power system model.
- **SCADA Configuration:** This stage involves actions to appropriately spawn SCADA VM's such as Control Center, Substation VM's depending on the WAMPAC experimental scenario chosen, and ensuring that the appropriate network topology is setup between the various VM's and the hardware devices that are mapped as part of the scenario.
- **Attack Orchestration:** Once all the systems are configured and initialized, the next stage is to spawn the attacker VM's and execute the attack vector on specified targets in coordination with the backend orchestration framework.
- **Defense Instrumentation:** After the power system and cyber system configuration steps are performed, the next stage involves actions to spawn defense measures. The defense measures could be setup either in the communication gateway nodes or on the individual hosts depending on the experimental scenarios and user inputs.
- **Experimental Results:** After the execution of the specified attack scenario, the next stage involves the collection of experimental artifacts on the cyber layer such as log files, packet captures, network performance metrics from the various systems and collection of power system simulation artifacts in the form of datasets, or plots of system states such as voltages, power flow and frequency.

The following subsections describe in detail the various activities that are performed as part of the overall design flow with respect to user interface (front-end) and experiment automation (backend).

2.2.1 User Interface Design

The user interface provides the user with an array of templates to select from and configure the system to perform a specific type of cyber attack/ defense experiment. Figure 3 shows the various activities with respect to the design flow for remote experimentation pertaining to the user interface. The user interface allows the user to select the power system model that is to be used from a list of choices such as IEEE 39 bus model IEEE 118 bus model, etc., As part of Step 2, the user can select the WAMPAC experimental scenarios to be used. For example, the list of available scenarios could be Remedial Action Schemes, Automatic Generation Control, State Estimation, etc., Each one of these WAMPAC applications correspond to a specific scenario and based on the user input they will be presented with subsequent web pages to select and map physical components such as relays and PMUs appropriately into their experiment, and also it determines the type and number of SCADA VM's needed. For the cyber system configuration, the user interface provides user with options to select the

network topology in which SCADA components should be connected. As part of defense measures, the user can select from either host based defense or network based defense.




Fig. 3. Design Flow for User Interface

Based on their inputs, user interface provides options to select from defense methodologies such as firewall, intrusion detection and prevention based defense, etc., for implementation. For orchestrating the attack, the user interface provides a list of attack vectors such as DOS attack, Command injection attack, coordinated attack to choose from, along with options to choose the attack locations on the system selected. The user interface has a visualization component where remote users can observe the status of the physical devices that are part of the attack on the cyber layer, and also simultaneously observe the power system impacts on the real-time power system simulator through real-time simulation plots. Once the experiment has been performed, the user interface facilitates the collection of cyber system impacts such as downloading packet captures, log files etc., during attack phase. As part of power system impacts, the user interface provides the option of data collection relevant to power system parameters such as voltage and power flow plots.

2.2.2 Experiment Automation

Figure 4 lists the various activities as part of the design flow that relates to experiment automation. Each of the activities is implemented using the backend orchestration framework through appropriate slave scripts that communicate to a master script. With respect to the power system configuration, the automation tasks involve loading, compilation of the appropriate power system model such as the IEEE 9 bus system model simulator, initializing the runtime interface, and ensuring that the model has reached its steady state operating condition before any attack actions are started. Depending on the WAMPAC experiment selection made, the backend automation scripts would configure physical components accordingly so that they could be mapped into the power system model for hardware-in-the-loop experiments, and also verify their integration

with the runtime interface. With respect to automating the cyber system, the backend configuration module spawns control center and substation VM's appropriately, and initializes the VM's in a specific network topology. Also, the scripts verify if inter-device communication is successful before proceeding further. Based on user selection, the backend scripts implement and initialize network based or host based defense measures such as firewalls, or intrusion detection systems on gateway nodes or on the hosts such as substation VM's.




Fig. 4. Design Flow for Experiment Automation

As part of attack orchestration, the backend scripts would spawn attacker VM's, which have a library of pre-defined attack modules. Based on the experiment scenario, the master script coordinates and triggers the specific attack scripts on these VM's. Once the experiment has successfully begun, the backend scripts periodically poll the status of the various devices involved in the experiment in the cyber layer, and update a run-time visualization screen on the front-end web server. Simultaneously, the web-based interface can also provide another screen with the run-time interface on the power system control VM to see the impact of the attacks on the power system. Depending on the type of power system simulator selected and the type of outputs requested by the user (i.e. real-time outputs vs. offline plots), the automation scripts would be adapted to provide real-time outputs or data files that are collected for the experimental scenario accordingly. As part of collecting the results on the cyber layer, the backend scripts would pull log files from the VM's where defense measures were deployed such as firewall and IDS logs, and packet captures from the gateway node, besides other network performance statistics. Similarly, the scripts on the power system control node would pull power system simulation artifacts such as data files or plots and make them available to the user as experimental results.

PowerCyber: STORY BOARD SCENARIOS

This section provides storyboard scenario overview of template driven remote access to ISU PowerCyber Testbed.

Story Board 1:

Cascading outage through a coordinated attack on power system protection scheme

In this scenario, the attack involves a combination of two coordinated attack actions on a power system protection scheme known as Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). Typically, RAS are intended to take specific protective measures to prevent the spread of large disturbances under heavy system loading conditions. However, the attacker intelligently triggers the operation of this RAS by creating a data integrity attack on unencrypted communication between the substation and the control center that uses the DNP3 protocol. In order to create a cascading outage, the attacker also blocks the communication between the protection relays that are involved in the RAS through a targeted Denial of Service (DoS) attack on one of the protection controllers. This prevents the successful operation of the RAS and in turn initiates secondary protection to be tripped to avoid thermal overload on the impacted transmission line. As a result of this coordinated attack involving data integrity attack to trip a breaker and a DoS attack on RAS communications, the overall system frequency is also affected as it causes the islanding of a generator from the rest of the system.

Story Board 2:

Manipulating AGC measurements/controls to affect system frequency

In this scenario, the attack involves a stealthy manipulation of measurements/controls used in Automatic Generation Control (AGC) algorithm to destabilize and affect the frequency of the power grid. This attack is a version of the classic Man-in-the-Middle attack, where the attacker intercepts the communication between the control center and the remote substations and chooses to stealthily modify either the frequency or tie-line measurements going to the control center, or the AGC control commands going to the generating stations. This is achieved by executing an ARP poisoning attack first, which tricks the remote substation to forward the data to the attacker before sending it to the external gateway. The attacker then selects the appropriate information that is to be replaced and modifies it appropriately using custom attack scripts and forwards it to the external gateway. As a result of this manipulation, there is a steady frequency deviation in the system. Eventually, this frequency deviation causes the load in the system to be shed in an attempt to restore frequency. A sustained attack could potentially lead to a major portion of the load in the power system to be unserved.

Story Board 3:

Manipulating SCADA measurements to affect situational awareness in State Estimator

In this scenario, the attack involves a careful manipulation of the measurements (analog and status) that come from the substation remote terminal units (RTU) to the control center for State Estimation. The attacker performs a stealthy attack where he exploits his knowledge about the measurement configurations at multiple

substations to carefully select the locations where he would manipulate the measurements. The attack vector involves the classic Man-in-the-Middle attack, where the attacker tricks the RTU to forward all its data to the attacker's machine instead of the substation gateway using an ARP poisoning attack. By decoding the unencrypted network traffic, the attacker selects and modifies appropriately certain targeted measurements to avoid detection by the State Estimator's Bad Data Detectors. This does not cause any bad data alarms in the control center and consequently, the attacker succeeds in impeding the situational awareness capabilities of the operator. Consequently, all applications that rely on State Estimator would be affected such as Contingency Analysis, Power Markets, etc., Also, this attack could be used to further trigger other attacks that could cause additional damage such as opening/overloading critical transmission lines.

Story Board 4:

Using unencrypted RTU communication to send arbitrary commands to trip breakers

The attacker gains physical access to the process WAN, on which he is able to gain a network address. As the data flows between RTUs and SCADA are not encrypted the attacker is able to read any transmitted data in clear text. The attacker uses this opportunity to perform an ARP spoof attack and position himself between an RTU and the PCU (i.e., a man-in-the-middle attack). As such, the attacker is able to both send malicious requests to the RTU and hide to the operator the real events. The attacker uses this for an unauthorized opening of a distribution feeder breaker feeding a major manufacturing industry connected directly on the 40 KV level. The attacker's intention is to create a power outage that will severely disturb or stop the production in a continuously operated plant in order to create economical and/or physical damage.

Story Board 5:

Denial of Service attack on RTU/protection devices communication to blind SCADA

The attacker has physical access to the RTU communication network and is as such able to connect his own equipment to the network using a switch in an unmanned substation. From this point the attacker floods a number of logical connections with a continuous stream of packets, which creates an overload in the Front-End applications and blinds the operators to what is happening in the grid. The attacker has chosen a time for the attack when a severe snow and ice storm is expected and the control operators are unable to counteract the loss of physical devices created by the storm. This leads to an overload of power lines feeding the capital city and this also goes unnoticed in the control centre. The blind SCADA severely delays the power restoration efforts to reenergize the capital city.

Story Board 6:

Exploiting Social Engineering to gain access to Energy Management Systems/ Substation Workstations

An uninformed operator in the control room connects his workstation to Internet during a night shift. He does this to be able to use Facebook to chat with his friends and to surf on Internet. This operator has the tendency to accept any friend request on Facebook and add as his friend. The attacker uses this to request the operator

to add him as a friend. In a chat, his Facebook friend sends him a link that was created by an attacker. Without becoming suspicious, the operator clicks on the link and gives the attacker access to his control room workstation. The attacker is now able to remotely connect to this system and he can open a shell with root privileges on the compromised system. From his own location the attacker is now able to open SCADA displays containing real-time information from the grid and to execute commands. He uses this to open HV breakers in the power grid, which leads to cascading events that causes a total blackout of the high voltage grid.

Story Board 7:

Manipulating protection settings using Substation Automation tools

The attacker is an employee of the attacked utility and he has access to substations and to substation engineering tools. He uses the engineering tools for the substation protection devices to set line protection parameters to default values. The default values in the protection devices are defined at such low limits that the protection devices will trip all power lines also at a normal operating state. The attack is done in a central HV/MV substation on the MV side and it will cause a total blackout in the capital city.

***PowerCyber:* USER MANUAL**

(Story Board 1)

Software Requirement: To access remote interface, user should connect to PowerCyber Virtual Private Network(VPN) by downloading VPN clients such as OpenVPN, Viscosity or Tunnelblick.


NOTE: Please refer contact information section to obtain VPN certificates and credentials for access.

Connection URL : <http://64.113.69.203:8080/DHSdemo/Welcome.php>


1. Please provide credentials provided to log into the framework.




2. Upon successful login the interface provides story board scenarios to choose from.




3. The next webpage provides a video snippet overview of the story board scenario chosen.




4. Home page consists of with four major categories for experiment simulation.




5. The first step in real-time Grid simulation involves the selection of IEEE system model(such as 9-bus, 39-bus, etc.) and selection of Wide area monitoring and protection schemes (such as Remedial Action Scheme, Automatic Generation Control, State Estimation, etc.).




6. The second step involves an identification of how the physical components should be mapped to the power system model.




- The selected model is compiled, loaded and executed on the real-time power system simulator and the run time visualization environment is provided to the user.




- The SCADA configuration module spawns SCADA virtual machines and communication topology specific to the story board selected.



9. The first step in attack orchestration involves reconnaissance and enumeration. The user performs host discovery to identify internet facing live hosts.



10. The Attacker tries to gather information by sniffing traffic between discovered hosts .




Due to the presence of site-to-site VPN tunnel between the control and substation network, information gathering fails.


11. To gain access into the internal network, the attacker performs intense port scanning on targetted hosts.

ISU Power cyber Lab 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDi x 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDemo/Attack_Step1.php?x=175&y=132


RECONNAISSANCE & ENUMERATION




HOST DISCOVERY




SNIFFING



PORT SCANNING



VULNERABILITY SCAN




PROCEED TO NEXT STEP

Windows taskbar: 3:42 PM 3/12/2016


12. Vulnerability scanning identifies heartbleed vulnerability in substation gateway.

ISU Power cyber Lab 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDi x 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDemo/Attack_Step1.php?x=175&y=132


RECONNAISSANCE & ENUMERATION




HOST DISCOVERY




SNIFFING



PORT SCANNING




VULNERABILITY SCAN




PROCEED TO NEXT STEP

Windows taskbar: 3:42 PM 3/12/2016


13. The second stage in attack orchestration involves vulnerability exploitation. The identified heart bleed vulnerability is exploited to obtain login credentials.




14. The attacker obtains SSH access into the substation gateway which in turn provides access to the substation internal network.



15. The attacker now executes the coordinated attack(Denial of service attack on RAS controller followed by malicious breaker trip command injection attack) on the power system to create cascading outage.



16. Defense instrumentation module provides options for firewall based defense, patch update, etc.,



17. SCADA network flow based firewall implementation blocks trip execution commands from hosts others primary or secondary control centers.

ISU Power cyber Lab 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDemo/Attack_Step2.php

CLICK HERE TO VIEW POWER SYSTEM IMPACTS

CLICK HERE TO VIEW IMPACT VISUALIZATION

HEARTBLEED

#root

SHELL ACCESS

DENIAL OF SERVICE

COMMAND INJECTION

COLLECT CYBER SYSTEM RESULTS

18. Closing SSH on Wide area network interface prevents external user from obtaining shell access into the substation gateway.

19. Updating the OpenSSL library in the substation gateway patches Heart Bleed bug preventing exploit of this vulnerability.

ISU Power cyber Lab 64.113.69.203:8080/DHSDemo/Attack_step1.php

RECONNAISSANCE & ENUMERATION

HOST DISCOVERY

PORT SCANNING

VULNERABILITY SCAN

SNIFFING

PROCEED TO NEXT STEP

CONTACT INFORMATION

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